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Abstract 
The aim of our research is to investigate the relationship between risk management, corporate governance and performance in 
lending institutions. Mainly, this research seeks to examine the effect of risk management and some board’s features on financial 
performance. Empirical analyses are conducted from a sample of 17 Tunisian lending institutions over the period 2002-2011 using 
an OLS regression. The study shows that board size affect performance significantly. Most importantly, the existence of a risk 
committee within the institution has a negative and significant effect on performance. 
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1. Introduction 
The call for better accountability is stronger every time there is a crisis in public confidence. Whether this is the case 
of the global financial crisis or collapses of several large firms, the resulting uncertainty has led to improved interest in 
corporate governance practices. By 2008, the subprime crisis in the United States had an important impact on financial 
institutions in a number of countries. Consequently, several institutions suffered from losses because of failed risk 
management and governance. Thus, the lessons learnt from financial crisis show the important role of implementing 
good corporate governance in firms, especially in banking sector.  
There is a growing realization that corporate governance and risk management may affect firm performance. 
Numerous large financial institutions no longer exist or have been taken over just because they neglected the central 
rules of risk management and control. In this respect, a number of researches try to find a relationship between risk 
management, corporate governance and performance. In the Tunisian context, the Central Bank of Tunisia launched a 
number of reforms in order to establish a modern system of corporate governance and internal control. It emphasizes 
the major role of risk management in financial institutions in Tunisia. These actions indicate that the Central Bank is 
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concerned about the importance of relationship between corporate governance, risk management, and firm 
performance.  
A wide literature has already been built to focus on risk management-related corporate governance mechanisms and 
their effects on performance (e.g., Aebi et al. 2012 and Minton et al. 2010). However, these researches used data only 
up until 2008 using samples of American banks. Given this fact, it is appropriate to build up our study using a sample 
of Tunisian lending institutions. There are two motivating factors in this study. First, there is limited literature and 
hence knowledge on corporate governance in developing countries such as Tunisia. This is because researches on this 
topic mainly focused on the experience of developing countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, other 
European nations and, recently, Australia and New Zealand. Second, there is little attention about risk management in 
studies on Tunisian financial institutions. In fact, this issue is not addressed in the literature within a Tunisian context 
using recent data.   
The study, therefore addresses the following research question: In Tunisian lending institutions, do corporate 
governance mechanisms, namely those related to board’s features, and risk management affect firm performance? We 
engage in an investigation of this relationship from 2002 to 2011 using an OLS regression. A sample of 17 Tunisian 
lending institutions was selected from listed firms in the Stock Exchange of Tunis. The selection was determined by 
the availability of data for years chosen in the sample.  
Following this introduction, section 2 is devoted to present previous literature on risk management, corporate 
governance and financial performance. From that, several hypotheses are developed and will be tested during this 
research. Section 3 presents the research design which details the data collection, and the empirical measures. Finally, 
findings will be discussed and summarized in section 4. Section 5 concludes.   
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Since the global economies have been significantly shaken all over the world, banks’ corporate governance become 
more important for stability and profitability of the financial sector. Therefore, the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial performance has received much more attention in the literature than other concepts (e.g., 
Mahmood and Abbas 2011, Peni and Vahamaa 2012). Risk management can also be considered as a new management 
concept. It becomes an important discipline that all financial institutions started accepting it in order to survive. In this 
respect, many authors recognize the importance of risk governance and its effect on firm performance (e.g., Ellul and 
Yerramilli 2011, Erkens et al. 2012). This is why we are going to try, in this second section, to briefly review the 
literature and present hypotheses of the study. 
2.1 Corporate Governance Literature 
The prior international literature provides different studies on corporate governance impact on firms’ value. In this 
direction, a wide literature has already been built to show the impact of features of the board of directors, executive 
management or shareholders on their efficiency. The board of directors is one of the internal governance mechanisms 
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that are designed to ensure that the interests of shareholders and managers are closely aligned, and to control or 
remove ineffective management teams (e.g., Kang et al. 2007).  
The combination of the board size and performance has been interpreted in several ways. Yermack (1996) use a 
sample of 452 large U.S. industrial corporations over the period between 1984 and 1991. He finds that firms with 
small boards also exhibit more favorable values for financial ratios, and provide stronger CEO performance incentives 
from compensation and the threat of dismissal. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) reached similar results and argue that 
an increase in board size will have a negative effect on firm performance. More recently, Uwuigbe and Fakile (2012) 
find that, in the banking sector in a developing country as Nigeria, banks are more viable when the board size is less 
than 13 and profits are greater with small boards. Therefore, these findings confirm the existence of a negative 
relationship between board size and bank financial performance. This can be explained by the fact that increasing the 
board size leads to increased agency problems which makes the board less effective. Hence, our hypothesis 1 is as 
follows: Board size is negatively related with firm performance. 
The entrance of outside directors on board is considered as board independence (e.g., Charreaux 1997). Board 
independence is one of the significant determinants of board effectiveness. A wide range of literature attempts to 
investigate the influence of board independence on firm performance. As mentioned by Fama (1980) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983), outside independent directors improve the effective control of managers in consideration of their 
incitement to exercise control. Panasian et al. (2003) find that increasing the proportion of outsiders in the board of 
directors can positively affect firm performance and reduce agency problem.  
Most research on this topic confirm that having a more independent board of directors does not lead to greater 
performance and may actually lead to worse performance. In an attempt to investigate the linkage between board 
independence and long-term performance of large American firms, Bhagat and Black (2002) find that firms with more 
independent boards do not perform better than other firms using a variety of performance measures. More recently, 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) confirm the existence of a negative relationship between board independence and operating 
performance. Erkens et al. (2012) reached similar conclusions by using a sample of 296 financial firms from 30 
countries. They find that firms with more independent boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse 
stock returns during the financial crisis. Then the hypothesis 2: Proportion of independent directors on the board is 
negatively related with firm performance.   
Many authors recognize the importance of the board of directors’ gender and its impact on firm performance. Shrader 
et al. (1997) find a significant negative relationship between the proportion of female board members and some 
accounting measures of performance. Similarly, Adams and Ferreira (2004) argue that the change in gender 
composition of the board may involve cost. Carter et al. (2010) findings do not support the business case for inclusion 
of women and ethnic minorities on firm boards but they find no evidence of any negative effect either. Their evidence 
suggests that decisions concerning the appointment of women and ethnic minorities to corporate boards should be 
based on criteria other than future financial performance.  
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Campbell and Vera (2008) using a sample of Spanish firms. They find that gender diversity leads to better 
performance and may generate economic gains. Adams and Ferreira (2009) find mixed results. In firms with weak 
governance, they confirm the existence of a positive impact of diversity on performance. In firms with strong 
governance, however, enforcing gender quotas in the boardroom could ultimately decrease shareholder value. This can 
be explained by the fact that greater gender diversity could result an over-monitoring in those firms. Then the 
hypothesis 3: Proportion of women on the board of directors is positively related with firm performance. 
In the last years a great number of companies converted from dual CEO leadership structure to non-dual structure 
while few of firms converted in the opposite direction (e.g., Carty and Weiss 2012). This recent trend is fairly due to 
several high-profile cases where powerful dual CEOs were found to abuse their power affecting firm’s expenses and 
shareholders. This reflection encouraged authors to study the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that CEO duality may prevent board’s ability to monitor management and then 
assumed to increase the agency cost. Separating the titles of CEO and chairman of the board, therefore, will improve 
firm performance which is consistent with the agency theory. Jensen (1993) points out that when the CEO also holds 
the chairman’s position, the board cannot evaluate the CEO which can lead to internal control systems failure.  Pi and 
Timme (1993) assert that, on average, splitting the role of CEO and chairman of the board in banks leads to better 
performance than combining titles. Goyal and Park (2002) argue that the lack of independent leadership in firms that 
combine the CEO and chairman positions makes it difficult for the board to remove poorly performing managers. It is 
therefore reasonable to expect that separating the titles of CEO and chairman of the board improves firm performance. 
Then the hypothesis 4: CEO duality is negatively related with firm performance.  
2.2 Risk Governance Literature 
Corporate governance of an entity is concerned and influenced by a series of relationships manifested both within and 
outside the organization. Parties interested in the good functioning of an entity, especially its shareholders, its 
management and its stakeholders, assume and take steps in the field of risk management. They aim to ensure 
adaptability to the business environment and business continuity (e.g., McNeil et al. 2005).  
In fact, to achieve corporate governance, organizations will implement internal control and risk management is one 
aspect of it. Much attention has been paid to the link between corporate governance and risk management in financial 
institutions. Consequently, a long literature on risk governance and financial performance helps put this relationship in 
perspective. Ellul and Yerramilli (2011) highlight the importance of risk governance by seeking to find out whether 
there is a link between strong and independent risk management and bank risk-taking and performance during the 
crisis. In doing this, they construct a Risk Management Index, or RMI for short, to measure the strength and 
independence of the risk management function in a sample of 74 large U.S. bank holding companies. They find that 
strong internal risk controls are useful in restraining risk-taking behavior at banking institutions. Beltratti and Stulz 
(2012) point out that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed worse during the crisis, were not less 
risky before the crisis ,and reduced more loans during the crisis. Their finding indicates that poor bank governance 
was not necessarily a major cause of the crisis.  
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In terms of using committees to gain a more focused understanding of risk, firm boards have historically adopted 
various approaches. The two main approaches are having a dedicated risk committee or combining risk oversight with 
another function and giving it to audit committee. This issue is presented by Mongiardino and Plath (2010) who focus 
on the authority of banks’ CROs and the independence of the risk management function. There is also a further point 
to be considered, the presence of a risk committee that supervises all the company’s risk is a signal that a firm is 
engaged in ERM. This is confirmed by Aebi et al. (2012), who point out that the presence of this committee indicates 
a stronger risk management. Thus, basing on previous findings on risk governance we formulate our hypothesis 5: 
Existence of risk committee is positively related with firm performance. 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources 
The sample used in this study is composed by a panel dataset of listed Tunisian lending institutions over the period 
2002-2011. Some firms were discarded due to the unavailability of data. There are 22 lending institutions listed in the 
Stock Exchange of Tunis in the beginning of 2013. From these institutions, we eliminate 3 institutions because of 
missing data or incomplete information on board attributes. This leaves us with a sample of 19 lending institutions for 
which we attempt to collect corporate and risk governance measures from different sources as outlined below.  
To provide a more representative analysis, a filter is used to exclude firms with outlying observations. In order to 
maintain a balanced panel by necessity 8 year-end observations were excluded. Table 1 reports the sample selection 
process which resulted in 17 lending institutions to give a balanced panel of 170 year-end observations over the period 
2002-2011. 
Table 1: Sample selection process 
Details Numbers of Companies Numbers of Observations 
Lending institutions listed in the beginning of 2013: 22  
 Banking  11  
 Non-banking (financial sevices) 11  
Companies with missi,g data or incomplete information 
on board attributes (3)  
Entire sample 19 190 
In % of listed companies 86%  
Extreme values  (12) 
Unbalance data  (8) 
Study sample 17 170 
In % of companies in our sample 89%  
 
In this research, we refer to companies’ reference documents obtained from the Tunisian Financial Market Council 
website as main support to collect data on. Due to limited availability of governance data on lending institutions as 
well as the neglect of risk governance data, we hand collect most of board of director’s data from stock guides 
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published by the Tunisian Stock Exchange with supplemental data collected from annual reports. We also obtained 
complementary information from Tunisia’s listed lending institutions, which are reported in each firm’s websites.  
3.2 Variables Measurement 
We dedicate this development to define variables used in this study while arguing the choice of measures. For 
performing the analysis, we considered a series of characteristics, which will stand as independent variables, in order 
to assess their influence on firms’ performance, the dependent variable.  
One of the frequent proxies used in prior literature to measure financial performance was Tobin’s Q which is 
calculated as the market value of equity plus the market value of debt divided by the replacement cost of all assets. 
Return on Equity, or ROE for short, can also be used. This variable was often used in prior related research too. It is 
defined as the net income divided by the book value of equity. Consistent with Core et al. (2006), Return on Assets, 
henceforth ROA, is considered as our primary measure of firm performance. It is calculated as the net income divided 
by the book value of total assets. This ratio is the most used ratio to integrate accounting based performance as proxies 
for firm performance (e.g., Lam and Lee 2008). ROA is also used because of the lack of information regarding the 
market value of firms in the sample, and due to the fact that such information are not usually discussed in their reports. 
After defining the performance measure, we next take a look at board of directors’ attributes which could explain the 
firm performance. We have retained size, independence, gender diversity and CEO duality. Risk management is 
expressed by one variable. In line with literature on corporate governance and performance, this study controls for 
several firm-specific characteristics. The choice of control variables is based on Aebi et al. (2012) and Beltratti and 
Stulz (2012), and partly dictated by data availability. 
The first variable is board size (BSZ). It is counted as the total number of directors in the board. A long literature on 
the board size of financial institutions helps put our study in perspective (e.g., Yermack 1996, Guest 2008). In the 
regression with ROA as dependent variable, we additionally include the board independence (NDP) defined as the 
number of outside independent directors to total directors on the board. An independent outside director is one whose 
only business relationship with the bank is his or her directorship. An independent outside director is not an existing or 
former employee of the bank and does not have any significant business/family ties with the bank (e.g., Charreaux 
1997). According to Weisbach (1988), people outside the company other than current or past employees of 
organization are supposed to be independent directors and are representatives of shareholder interest. The third 
variable is CEO duality (DUA). Measured by a dummy variable, it takes “1” if the CEO and the chairman of the board 
of directors of a firm are the same person, and “0” otherwise. With power concentrated in one person, there is a 
potential loss of diversification and independence that may impact the overall success of the corporation. The dual 
office structure also allows the CEO to effectively control information available to other board members and therefore 
impedes effective monitoring (e.g., Jensen 1993). The fourth variable is the proportion of female directors on the 
board of each financial institution (GDV). Gender diversity is a major area of interest in the corporate governance 
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literature. Campbell and Vera (2008) measure this variable as a dummy measure indicating the existence of one or 
more female directors.  
Following Aebi et al. (2012), the last variable (RSK) is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if the institution has a 
committee charged with monitoring and managing the risk management efforts within the institution (Risk 
committee). Firms, for which the variable takes the value of zero, have either no committee in charge of risk 
management at all or the audit committee assumes responsibility. As far as risk management, several measures of risk 
are used in prior literature. For example Laeven and Levine (2009) use Z-score as a proxy of bank risk. It equals the 
sum of return on assets and the capital asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset returns. A high value of Z-
score is a sign of better stability of the bank. However, Magalhaes et al. (2010) employ earnings volatility to measure 
risk. It is defined as the standard deviation of the ratio of total earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions divided 
by total assets. Ghazouani and Moussa (2013) use the non-performing loans to reflect bank’s credit risk, and it is 
measured by the proportion of non-performing loans in total bank loans. 
We regress variables mentioned above on a performance variable by controlling a set of variables which affect firm 
performance, and therefore give an alternative explanation for changes in performance. Firstly, due to the fact that 
total assets tend to have a highly skewed distribution, the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets is used as 
a measure of firm size (SIZ). Anderson and Fraser (2000) show that larger banks are more capable of diversifying risk, 
both geographically and by industry, than small banks. Moreover, larger banks have greater access to capital markets 
and thus more ability to adjust to unexpected liquidity and capital shortfalls. Secondly, we include the ratio of cash 
and short-term investments to total assets (CSH). Caprio et al. (2007) indicate that whether the bank is heavily 
capitalized, whether there are large provisions against bad loans, the liquidity structure of the bank and the size of the 
bank could all inﬂuence both valuations and ownership. Thirdly, the cost control (SAL) reflects firm’s operating 
efficiency and it is computed by total wages and salaries over total expenses. More operational efficient firms are 
expected to be more profitable. It requires optimality in utilization of salaries and expenses. In addition, many 
researchers consider operational efficiency as a specific factor affecting profitability (e.g., Athanasoglou et al. 2008).  
The next variable is tax rate (TAX), measured as the ratio of total taxes paid to profit before tax. It denotes the proxy 
measure of tax planning most frequently used by many academic researchers (e.g., Robinson et al. 2010). Tax 
planning represents a significant cost to the firm and shareholders. Slemrod (2004) suggests linking manager’s 
compensation to desirable outcomes such as taxes paid. Finally, Pathan and Faff (2013) stipulate that statistically 
significant and positive coefficients on total capital ratio indicate that highly capitalized banks perform better. Cornett 
et al. (2009) found that capital is negatively related to earnings management. Thus, banks with high levels of income 
and capital record more loan losses and fewer securities gains. Equity to assets ratio (CPL) is measured as total equity 
divided by total assets. This control variable measures the level of capitalization of lending institutions. Theoretically, 
when equity levels are low, insolvency risk is high because capital serves as a shield to protect firms when asset values 
decrease. Table 2 presents means, standard deviations and correlations for the variables included in our study. 
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Statistics, not reported for space, are also broken up into financials subsamples, in order to detect any specialization 
specific trend.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. ROA 0.02 0.04 -          
2. BSZ 10.5 1.78 -0.37          
3. NDP 0.39 0.23 -0.18 -0.15         
4. DUA 0.58 0.49 -0.16 -0.24 -0.07        
5. GDV 0.03 0.08 -0.09 -0.01 -0.17 -0.19       
6. RSK 0.19 0.39 -0.18 -0.19 -0.13 -0.16 -0.12      
7. SIZ 13.6 1.79 -0.58 -0.49 -0.05 -0.34 -0.05 -0.16     
8. CSH 0.03 0.02 -0.16 -0.02 -0.13 -0.11 -0.13 -0.21 -0.12    
9. CPL 0.12 0.21 -0.69 -0.28 -0.13 -0.37 -0.14 -0.04 -0.71 -0.17   
10. SAL 0.12 0.15 -0.53 -0.03 -0.48 -0.12 -0.14 -0.01 -0.29 -0.18 -0.55  
11. TAX 0.63 2.99 -0.04 -0.03 -0.11 -0.09 -0.33 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 
 
Our key dependent variable is performance measured by ROA ratio. The table shows that on average, lending 
institutions included in our sample generate profit in relation to its overall resources of about 2%. The descriptive 
statistics of 11 banks reveal a mean performance value of 0.7%. This is comparable to the mean reported by 
Ghazouani and Moussa (2013), even somewhat lower, for their sample of 10 Tunisian banks over the period 1998-
2011 (0.8%). For financial services, they did quite well during this period; the mean value of ROA increases to 4%. 
Focusing on the board size criteria (BSZ), the number of directors in the board has a mean of about 11 directors with 
39% being outside independent directors (NDP). This figure is similar to those reported in Trabelsi (2010) for his 
sample of 10 banks over the period 1997-2007 with the exception of NDP which was higher at 80%. For her 8 
Tunisian banks in 2006, Damak (2013) reveals that 50% of them opted for the maximum number of board members 
namely 12 members, 12.5% of the banks chose a board of 10 members, 12.5% opted for a board of 11 members and 
25% opted for a council of 8 members. In other words, the average number of members per board is almost 11. 
Independent directors are considered in 75% of cases in the sample. 
In terms of women participation on the board (GDV), only 3% of the boards of directors are females. But, there is a 
large difference among firms in our sample. The board diversity as posted by financial services amounts to 5.7%; it’s 
substantially higher compared to 2.3% shown by banking. This is may be explained by firms’ GDV which ranges from 
0% to 36.3%. In almost 58% of the lending institutions, the chair of the board is also the CEO. Trabelsi (2010) notes 
that 82.5% of managers preside the board of directors of banks hence the absence of their control. Damak (2013) 
makes known that only 25% of banks have dual roles as president of the board of directors and CEO. There may be 
two reasons for the finding of higher CEO duality. First, our study uses a panel dataset and includes a larger sample 
than the one in Damak (2013). Second, our descriptive statistics show that there is a trend towards smaller duality of 
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direction in the time period from 2000 to 2011. As Damak findings are based on 2006, the lower figures may partly 
result from this trend. In fact, there is a desire to make the control in banks more effective and rigorous.  
Focusing on risk management criteria (RSK), there are only 32 year-end observations with a dedicated risk committee, 
and all from banks; 81% of the institutions have either no special committee devoted to risk management at all or the 
audit committee assumes this responsibility. This amount can be explained by the fact that Tunisian banks are smaller 
as compared to international banks, and the existence of risk committee is substantially related to bank size (e.g., Aebi 
et al. 2012).  
Now, let us look at multicollinearity problem. The examination of the Pearson’s correlation coefficients allows us to 
study the null hypothesis of no correlation between explanatory variables. We consider 0.8 as the limit value of the 
correlation coefficient, which corresponds to the limit set by Kennedy (1985), to confirm the null hypothesis. Hence, if 
correlation between two variables exceeds 0.8, we have to reject the null hypothesis and we start having serious 
problems of multicollinearity. In our case, the correlation matrix shows that all coefficients are below 0.8, and no 
correlation was significant. We can conclude, then, in the absence of multicollinearity between the explanatory 
variables; that it is not necessary to exclude some variables.  
In order to further ensure the absence of multicollinearity between variables, we used the Variation Inflation Factor 
test. The VIF, for short, measures the degree to which each explanatory variable can be explained by the other 
explanatory variable. Thus, when the VIF is less than 10, multicollinearity is not considered as a problem. Given this 
test, all variables have values less than 10; the mean is equal to 2.24. So, the problem of multicollinearity does not 
seem critical, and thereafter, all variables in our study can be accepted.   
4. Results and Discussion 
Using the panel data analysis method, a series of regression models are projected. The regression specification 
reported in Colunm 1 incorporates only the set of four hand-collected variables related to the board of directors and 
control variables. To assess the potentially impact of the existence of risk committee on firm performance, the above 
regression is extended by including the risk variable RSK. The results are reported in Colunm 2.  Before doing so, we 
compare, in a first step, the various board of directors’ characteristics and control variables between lending 
institutions with a risk committee and institutions with no risk committee. The aim is to obtain a first impression on 
potential differences between these two groups of firms.  
4.1. Univariate Mean Tests 
The literature cited above (e.g., Aebi et al.) highlights that banks with a Chief Risk Officer, or CRO for short, in the 
executive board have a superior corporate governance structure than banks, in which the CRO is not a member of the 
executive board. Following, we check if similar results can also be obtained for Tunisian firms by simply conducting 
mean tests. We therefore split our sample into different panels on the basis of the risk committee’s existence in the 
institution. The results are reported in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Comparisons of companies with a risk committee and other companies  
 
Risk Committee in 
Company Difference t-statistic p-value Number of Observations 
 No Yes    No Yes 
ROA 0.021 0.004 -0.017 -2.421 0.016** 138 32 
BSZ 10.39 11.28 -0.890 -2.594 0.010*** 138 32 
NDP 0.408 0.328 -0.080 -1.774 0.077* 138 32 
DUA 0.615 0.406 -0.209 -2.180 0.030** 138 32 
GDV 0.031 0.055 -0.024 -1.561 0.120 138 32 
SIZ 13.48 14.22 -0.740 -2.127 0.034** 138 32 
CSH 0.028 0.016 -0.012 -2.772 0.006*** 138 32 
CPL 0.196 0.171 -0.025 -0.589 0.556 138 32 
SAL 0.124 0.128 -0.004 -0.136 0.891 138 32 
TAX 0.718 0.264 -0.454 -0.773 0.440 138 32 
Note: * Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, *** Significance at the 1% level. 
Most importantly, Table 3 shows that lending institutions with a dedicated risk committee reveal basic ROA. The 
picture with respect to board attributes variables is mixed. Results show that lending institutions with a dedicated risk 
committee have a larger board on average and are more likely to introduce female members in the board of directors. 
Institutions with no risk committee have a higher percentage of outside independent directors but they are more likely 
to combine the CEO and chairman position which is generally considered to indicate poorer corporate governance.  
Control variables show that institutions with a dedicated risk committee are significantly larger and have lower 
liquidity. Capital ratio, operating efficiency and tax rate variables do not differ significantly between institutions with 
and institutions without a risk committee. However, to deduce some conclusive evidence, we have to rely on 
multivariate analysis where many of the explanatory variables are introduced in the same time. 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
The first step is to check the existence of individual effects in our data. We seek, therefore, to test the null hypothesis: 
there is no individual effect. The result is an F-statistic of Hsiao (1986). If we accept the null hypothesis of 
homogeneity, we obtain a model of pooled completely homogeneous. If we reject the null hypothesis, then we must 
include the individual effects in the model and move to the second step. Indeed, in the two equations, F-statistics are 
significantly lower than 2 and p-values of less than 10%. The result allows us to accept the panel, and we conclude 
that there are individual effects. Hausman (1978) propose a test to select the best estimator among the random effect 
estimator and the fixed effect estimator. It is a specification test which determines whether two estimations’ 
coefficients are statistically different. The idea of this test is that, under the null hypothesis of independence between 
errors and explanatory variables, both estimators are unbiased, so the estimated coefficients should differ slightly. 
In addition, the question of heteroscedasticity in the context of panel data is raised. Heteroscedasticity refers to data 
that does not have a constant variance. It does not bias the estimation of the coefficients, but the usual inference is no 
longer valid since the standard deviations found are not the accurate. Breusch and Pagan (1979) test whether the 
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estimated variance of the residuals from a regression are dependent on the values of the independent variables. In the 
context of a heteroscedasticity test, the null hypothesis is that all coefficients of the regression of squared residuals are 
equal to zero. The alternative hypothesis is the assumption of heteroscedasticity. In our study, each probability is more 
than 10%. So, distributions are homoscedastic. 
It is also important to check the presence of correlation between errors and individuals. Wooldridge (2002) derives a 
simple test for autocorrelation in panel data models. This test checks that the sum of the squares of correlation 
coefficients between errors is approximately zero. The null hypothesis of this test is the independence of residues 
between individuals. The results have led us to select the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the level of 10%. 
Table 4: Regressions of company performance on board and risk variables 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
 Regression Estimations 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient z-statistic Coefficient z-statistic 
Constant -0.0300 -0.85 -0.0207 -0.69 
BSZ -0.0055 -3.43*** -0.0052 -3.53*** 
NDP -0.0029 -0.24 -0.0016 -0.16 
DUA -0.0021 -0.37 -0.0051 -0.98 
GDV -0.0032 -0.10 -0.0156 -0.59 
RSK   -0.0152 -2.72*** 
SIZ -0.0016 -0.62 -0.0026 -1.09 
CSH -0.0298 -0.33 -0.1054 -1.16 
CPL -0.0893 -4.14*** -0.0954 -4.97*** 
SAL -0.0609 -3.26*** -0.0591 -3.33*** 
TAX -0.0001 -0.11 -0.0001 -0.02 
Number of observations 170 170 
R-squred 0.895 0.937 
Hausman 12.70 11.49 
Breusch-Pagan  0.61 0.19 
Note: *** Significance at the 1% level. 
The main results of our empirical analysis are presented in Table 4. Most importantly, the table reports that the 
coefficient on board size (BSZ) is negative and significant in all two specifications. This finding is consistent with 
Trabelsi (2010) who shows that a high number of the board’s members has a very negative effect over performance. 
He explains the phenomenon by the fact that this board has no rule in managers’ decision and consequently this effect 
is negative. The significant negative relationship found between larger board size and ROA is coherent with the 
conclusions drawn by Yermack (1996): firms for board sizes 4 through 8 are all significantly positive, those for board 
sizes 9 through 11 are statistically insignificant, whilst those for board sizes 12 through 17 are significantly negative, 
and increasingly so. Therefore for this measure, there is strong evidence of an inverted U-shaped relation between 
board size and performance which suggests that the optimal board size is between four and six.  
The variable measuring the percentage of outside independent directors on the board (NDP) is not significant but 
positive in only one specification. This finding confirms the effect expected by the agency theory. Ruigrok et al. 
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(2006) add that outside board members have only limited time that they can invest in any individual board mandate. 
They consequently lack much of the intimate knowledge and expertise on the way things are done and decisions are 
reached in the firm. The coefficients on both CEO duality (DUA) and board diversity (GDV) are also never estimated 
to be significant. The CEO duality remains negative in all specification. This finding is consistent with Trabelsi (2010) 
and in line with agency theory; the association between the president of the board’s function and the role of the 
manager negatively influences performance. The coefficient on board diversity is positive but not significant in all 
Columns. This opens up the way for an explanation in terms of gender diversification gains. This result is consistent 
with those found by Erhardt et al. (2003) using a sample of U.S firms.  
The coefficient on RSK is negative and significant. The conclusion that may be drawn from Table 4 is that the 
presence of a dedicated risk committee affects significantly firm performance. This finding is consistent with Aebi et 
al. (2012) but in fact somewhat counter-intuitive; having a risk committee in the institution is usually considered as 
good corporate governance and seems to positively affect the firms’ assets returns. 
As for control variables, operating efficiency (SAL) indicator is positively related to performance and significant in all 
two specifications. This result confirms our expectation and stands in line with the results of Ghazouani and Moussa 
(2013). When looking at capital ratio (CPL), we confirm a positive and significant relationship. This may indicate that 
well-capitalized banks have higher profitability. It is consistent with theories stressing that highly capitalized banks 
can charge more for loans and pay less on deposits because they face lower bankruptcy risks. Firm size (SIZ) ans 
liquidity (CSH) show no significant effect on ROA in all two specifications. As well, our results show no significance 
about the impact of tax charges (TAX) on firm performance. This means that Tunisian lending institutions do not 
adjust their profit according to statutory tax rates. This may be due to the fact that 48.75% of banks are state-owned or 
partly over the period 1997-2007 (e.g., Trabelsi, 2010).  
5. Conclusions  
The results of our research allow us to identify a significant and negative relationship between firm performance and 
board size. Therefore for this measure, there is strong evidence that a small board of directors improves firms’ 
performance. However, board independence has a negative but insignificant effect on firm performance. As for gender 
diversity and CEO duality, the results show no significant effect on performance. This indicates that it does not matter 
for performance what values these variables have. Most importantly, empirical validation of our research show that the 
existence of a risk committee within the institution has a negative and significant effect on performance. As for control 
variables, results show that firm capitalization and operating efficiency positively and significantly affect performance. 
Regarding the other control variables, firm size and tax rate have both insignificant and positive effect on firm 
performance. Similarly, cash and short term investment to total assets ratio has insignificant but negative effect on 
performance. 
In answering our research question, we find that some corporate governance mechanisms, specifically those related to 
the board of directors, affect firm performance. We also find that risk management negatively affects corporate 
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performance within Tunisian lending institutions. This research presents issues about relationships between corporate 
governance, risk management and firm performance in Tunisia. Thereby, it contributes to the existing literature since 
it examines the relationship between the three mentioned notions within a Tunisian context using recent data.  
Our results are inconsistent with most of previous researches which confirm a significant relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and performance and find that risk management improves firm performance. The 
fact that results found in our research are different may be due to the small size of the sample used in the study. Thus, 
results could be more significant if the sample was larger. This study provides directions for future research. The 
introduction of other explanatory variables and realizing cross countries comparison would be appropriate. In addition, 
the study that we conduct should be considered as a preliminary to a more complete study on a larger sample including 
more non-financial firms. 
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